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ON PRIVILEGING GOD'S MORAL GOODNESS 
Eric Funkhouser 
Prima jacie, there is an incompatibility between God's alleged omnipotence 
and impeccability. I argue that this incompatibility is more than prima facie. 
Attempts to avoid this appearance of incompatibility by allowing that there 
are commonplace states of affairs that an omnipotent being cannot bring 
about are unsuccessful. Instead, we should accept that God is not omnipo-
tent. This is acceptable since it is a mistake to hold that omnipotence is a 
perfection. God's moral perfection should be privileged over God's potency 
properties-and the same is true of human beings as well. 
Some qualities seem to be conducive to this good will and can fa-
cilitate its action, but in spite of that they have no intrinsic uncondi-
tional worth. They rather presuppose a good will, which limits the 
high esteem which one otherwise rightly has for them and prevents 
their being held to be absolutely good. (Kant, Foundations of the Meta-
physics of Morals) 
I will extol You, my God, 0 King; and I will bless Your name forever 
and ever. Every day I will bless You, and I will praise Your name for-
ever and ever. Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised; and His 
greatness is unsearchable. One generation shall praise Your works 
to another, and shall declare Your mighty acts. I will meditate on the 
glorious splendor of Your majesty, and on Your wondrous works. 
Men shall speak of the might of Your awesome acts, and I will declare 
Your greatness. They shall utter the memory of Your great goodness, 
and shall sing of Your righteousness. (Psalms 145) 
Introduction 
Various well-known problems arise on the assumption that God is a perfect 
being. One of these problems concerns an apparent conflict between two 
properties that theists commonly attribute to God -impeccability and om-
nipotence. Let's define 'impeccability' as essential moral goodness. In possible 
worlds talk! an impeccable being is one that, minimally, does only morally 
good or permissible deeds in all the possible worlds in which it exists. In 
no possible world does an impeccable being perform a morally bad deed. I 
will not yet define 'omnipotence', as that is a subject of much controversy, 
which I address below. But, intuitively, an omnipotent being can do every-
thing (in some restricted sense of this word), or at least more than any other 
possible being. But, since an impeccable being does not do a morally bad 
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deed in any possible world, it does not seem like an impeccable being can 
do some things. Worse, these are deeds that imperfect, finite beings can 
easily perform. How, then, can an impeccable being be omnipotent? 
Let's get a concrete case before us: 
If God is omnipotent, then God possesses the maximum amount of 
power possible. A being that is maximally powerful could thrust a 
knife through an innocent child's chest for amusement. After all, fi-
nitely powerful creatures can do this. But if Cod is also impeccable, 
then God essentially refrains from performing morally bad deeds. 
An impeccable being could never (because such a being would nev-
er?) thrust a knife through an innocent child's chest for amusement. 
So we have a contradiction-God both can and cannot thrust a knife 
through an innocent child's chest for amusement. 
This example presents a conflict between God's morality and power. 
Theorists who react to this conflict almost invariably attempt to avoid the 
difficulty by doctoring the intuitive understanding of 'omnipotence' so 
that God's omnipotence is compatible with his inability to perform certain 
deeds.2 I will argue that this is a mistake. I will defend an understand-
ing of omnipotence according to which omnipotence is incompatible with 
impeccability. (Impeccability is simply assumed, though not necessarily 
endorsed, as a perfection.) But I do not see this as a problem for theism, as 
I see no reason, except for a misguided attempt at reverence, to attribute 
omnipotence to the perfect being. Implicitly at least, most of us realize that 
God's moral goodness should be privileged over his metaphysical powers, 
and I openly embrace and defend this conception of God. 
The Perfections 
Let us say that God, if Cod exists,3 is the perfect being, or the being most 
worthy of worship and praise.4 Then, to inquire after the properties pos-
sessed by God is to inquire after the properties possessed by the perfect 
being.5 These properties are commonly called the perfections, and they cus-
tomarily include omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. They 
are also typically taken to be essential properties of a perfect being.6 While 
perfections other than these three have certainly been argued for and/or 
asserted, I will limit my discussion of God's perfections to these three. I 
also assume that there are at least two components to being a perfection. 
First, a perfection is an intrinsically desirable or valuable type of prop-
erty. Second, a perfection is the maximum possible value (perhaps infinite 
value) of that property. 
We can apply these two components to the alleged perfection omni-
science. Those who advocate the view that omniscience is a perfection are 
committed to: 1) knowledge being an intrinsically desirable or valuable 
property, and 2) God possessing the maximum amount of knowledge. We 
can also see why both components are necessary. Omni-massiveness is 
not a perfection due to the failure of the first component-mass is not an 
intrinsically desirable or valuable property. And doing-good-most-of-the-
time is not a perfection due to a failure of the second component-it would 
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be better to do good all of the time! Those in the Anselmian tradition would 
oHer a third component to the perfections-that a perfection is an essential 
property, as we have previously mentioned. 
Well-known troubles have been raised against the possibility of a be-
ing possessing the three customary perfections. The Problem of Evil, for 
example, arises when these three alleged perfections are conjoined with 
apparent moral and natural facts about the world. But this is not an argu-
ment against the possibility of a being with these three perfections, it is 
"only" against its actuality. Other problems arise when we attend to these 
perfections themselves (absent any empirical considerations). These con-
ceptual objections argue against the very possibility of such a perfect be-
ing. We can distinguish between internal conceptual objections to alleged 
perfections, as considered in isolation, and external conceptual objections 
to combinations of alleged perfections. For example, some have argued 
that the very concept of omnipotence is incoherent, so it cannot be a per-
fection. 7 Similar arguments have been raised against the very possibility 
of an essentially morally perfect being.8 In the present terminology, these 
are internal objections. The conflict that interests us, as it deals with the 
possibility of an omnipotence-impeccability combination, is an external 
objection (to one conception of the perfect being). It is natural that such a 
conflict between God's moral goodness and potency should arise, as both 
properties concern the limitations, or lack thereof, on the actions that God 
can and will perform. 
On the Perversion of a Pelfectly Good Word 
l\1any within the theistic tradition have responded to the impeccabil-
ity-omnipotence conflict by claiming that God cannot do the immoral 
actions in question, but that these limitations are consistent with God's 
omnipotence (see footnote 2). Many of these theorists go on to construct 
a definition of 'omnipotence' whereby omnipotence is compatible with 
such limitations. I think this is mistaken. 
But before presenting my argument for this, I would like to acknowl-
edge the ways in which omnipotence is, or at least might be, compatible 
with certain limitations. I am understanding potency as the power to (i.e., 
can) bring about states of affairs.9 Taking 'omnipotence' with literal seri-
ousness, an omnipotent being is one that can bring about all states of af-
fairs. But omnipotence in this sense is not possible. First, there are states 
of affairs that are impossible (in the strictest sense) to bring about, such 
as changing the past, squaring the circle, causing someone else's free ac-
bon, etc. This point is acknowledged by all reasonable parties, and we 
immediately should weaken our understanding of 'omnipotence' to cover 
"only" all logically/metaphysically possible states of affairs. Second, even 
with this limitation in place, all individually logically/metaphysically pos-
sible states of affairs might not be com-possible. For example, state of af-
fair X might be possible and state of affair Y might be possible, but the 
combination of X and Y is not possible. I agree that it is not logically/ 
metaphysically possible to bring about, collectively, all the individually 
IJgically/metaphysically possible states of affairs. So, we should under-
stand' omnipotence' along the lines of supreme or maximal powerfulness: 
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an omnipotent being is one that can bring about the most (or a weighted 
most of the) logically/metaphysically possible states of affairs. For present 
purposes, we can stop with these acknowledgements and live with this, 
admittedly vague and incomplete, characterization. 
Other claims are more definite and clear. A being is not omnipotent if 
there are possible beings more powerful than it. To deny this is to pervert 
the meaning of a perfectly good word -' omnipotence' - and to be talking 
about some other concept altogether. The following principle, which gen-
erates a necessary condition for omnipotence, captures this point: 
The Maximality of Omnipotence: If there is a possible being, B, that 
has the power to (i.e., can) bring about all the states of affairs that be-
ing A can bring about and then some, then being A is not omnipotent. 
Here, then, is an extremely simple argument for the conclusion that a being 
that is unable to bring about immoral states of affairs is not omnipotent: 
1. The Maximality of Omnipotence. 
2. God does not have the power to (i.e., cannot) bring about morally 
bad states of affairs. God is impeccable, or essentially morally good. 
(Assumption) 
3. There is a possible being with the power to bring about all the states 
of affairs that God can bring about and then some (e.g., morally bad 
states of affairs). (By 2 and conceivability) 
4. God is not omnipotent. (From 1 and 3) 
Clearly the argument is valid, so let's consider the premises. 
Premise 1 
Again, 1 seems painfully obvious. Many theists wish to attribute omnipo-
tence to God. But it does no good to keep the word by changing its mean-
ing. Omnipotence concerns power, and if there are possible beings that 
can do more than God, then God clearly is not the most powerful of all 
possible beings and certainly not omnipotent. A community of speakers 
can change the meaning of 'omnipotence' if they wish, but that would be a 
misguided attempt at reverence. Calling a tail a leg does not make it one. 
That said, a philosopher as great as Aquinas boldly rejected the present 
intuition by claiming: "To sin is to fall short of a perfect action, hence to be 
able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to omnip-
otence. Therefore, it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence."](1 
On reading this passage, it is clear that Aquinas cannot be thinking of 
omnipotence as the power to bring about states of affairs. If omnipotence 
is the power to bring about states of affairs, as I am suggesting the term 
should be used, then the ability to sin (e.g., bring about morally bad states 
of affairs) is not "repugnant to omnipotence." On the contrary, it is yet an-
other power! We certainly have this concept of God's powers (e.g., God as 
creator and sustainer of the universe), and it this concept that the present 
debate is about. Either Aquinas is simply mistaken in his claim, or he is 
talking about another concept. 
ON PRIVILEGING GOD'S MORAL GOODNESS 413 
Premise 2: 
Since 2 is listed as an assumption, it seems immune from attack. Techni-
cally, only the second sentence of 2 is an assumption, however. The first 
sentence of 2 explains the assumption and equates "having the power to 
do X" with "can do X." This subtle movement is also found in the char-
aderization of The Maximality of Omnipotence. But some will, and have, 
rejected this as a conflation of distinct concepts. What is undeniable by all 
parties, simply given the definition of 'impeccability', is that God cannot 
do certain actions. But some will distinguish "can do" from "having the 
power to do" and argue that God nevertheless has the power to do what 
God cannot do (I do hope that sounds odd!). Let's consider this objection 
in detail, as refuting it is most critical to defending the present under-
standing of 'omnipotence' . 
One way this objection proceeds is by distinguishing among God's dif-
ferent faculties and their implications for various possibilities. For exam-
ple, one might argue that God can do the stabbing qua omnipotent being, 
but not qua omnibenevolent (or impeccable) being. In saying this a dis-
tinction is made between God's faculties of power and morality, though 
these faculties are similar in that each contributes to determining those 
actions that God can perform (this jurisdictional overlap later proves to be 
crucial). The claim is that God's inability to do the stabbing simpliciter is 
not due to a lack of power, but due to God's moral character. This faculty-
relativizing approach obviously divorces the question: "Does God have 
tile power to do X?" from the, intuitively related, question "Is it possible 
for/can God to do X?" 
This objection is best justified by example, and here I tum to one pre-
sented by Erik Wielenberg (2000). Let's say that Hercules is a very strong 
man, tested with various weight-lifting tasks and succeeding at them 
all. However, a trickster gives Hercules a mere lO-pound stone that he is 
unable to lift because it has been greased. Should we conclude that Her-
cules is not so strong after all, since he cannot lift this lO-pound stone? 
vVielenberg answers in the negative, pointing out that Hercules still has 
the strength to lift this stone (since he has lifted much heavier things) "even 
though it is metaphysically impossible that he do SO."l1 The general conclusion 
Wielenberg reaches from such examples is as follows: 
What I want to suggest is that just as it is a mistake to try to explicate 
omni-strength in terms of which objects a being can lift, it is also a 
mistake to try to explicate omnipotence in terms of which states of 
affairs a being can bring about. 12 
The application to our problem is obvious. God still can possess the power 
to do the stabbing, though, given his omnibenevolent essence, it is meta-
physically impossible for God to do the stabbing. 
This response relies on relativizing abilities to faculties. Relative to his 
gripping faculty, Hercules cannot lift the stone. But relative to his strength 
faculty, he can lift the stone. Relative to his morality faculty, God cannot 
stab the child. But relative to his potency faculty, God can stab the child. 
The comparison is not perfect, however, and perhaps a dissimilarity in the 
cases supports an objection to this response. 
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In the Hercules case, the gripping and strength faculties are two (among 
others) of the necessary components for lifting things in the ordinary phys-
ical manner. With respect to lifting the greased stone, Hercules meets the 
qualifications for one of the necessary components but not the other. This 
is why he cannot lift the stone simpliciter. It is appropriate to specify that 
Hercules' failure is in virtue of his gripping faculty inadequacies, and not 
in virtue of his (physical) strength faculty. The strength of Hercules has 
not yet been impugned. These conclusions about Hercules are granted. 
Of course, we should not confuse physical strength with the broader 
concept of power (and I am not accusing Wielenberg of this confusion). 
Physical strength certainly contributes to one's powers, though it is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for having power. Against necessity: God has 
the power to create the Earth, though lacking the physical strength (on the 
assumption that God is not a physical being). Against sufficiency: Her-
cules has the physical strength to lift the greased stone, but he lacks the 
power. In order to have the power to lift greased stones, one also must 
possess proper gripping power. 
We have seen, as in the case of Hercules, that we can sometimes divide 
the power to do x into component parts (faculties). Does this also hold for 
God? God, I am assuming, is not a physical being, and does things by will 
aloneP The immediate connection between will and outcome, in the case 
of God, eliminates the need for other faculties in God's production of out-
comes. Importantly, this point breaks the analogy between Hercules and 
God. If God does things by will alone, then God cannot do things relative 
to some faculty or other. Instead, God always has (or lacks) the power to 
do something simpliciter (and never only relative to some faculty). 
So, in order to determine if God has the power (simpliciter) to do x, we 
simply need to determine if God has the will power to do x. But this in-
quiry into God's will power is ambiguous. We may be asking: 
i) If God were to will to do x, would x obtain? or 
ii) Could God will to do x? 
On the assumption of impeccability, the correct answer to question ii) is 
"no." I have argued that, with this information in hand (in conjunction 
with premises 1 and 3), we can now legitimately conclude that God is not 
omnipotent. Let's take x to be the stabbing of an innocent child. God could 
not will to stab an innocent child (from impeccability). If God cannot will 
to stab the innocent child, then God does not have the will power to stab 
the innocent child. (How else should we understand will power? Are we to 
say that God cannot will the action qua impeccable being, but can will the 
action qua [fill in the blank]? But how can we fill in this blank, given that 
God's power is God's will?) But will power is the only kind of power God 
has.14 So, God does not have the power to stab an innocent child. 
Those who disagree, however, may interpret the inquiry into God's will 
power in the question i) sense. So, the relevant question for this opponent 
is: If God were to will to stab an innocent child, would that obtain? Think-
ing that the answer here is "yes," this opponent concludes that God has 
the power to do wrong (even though God cannot do wrong).15 One obvi-
ous complication here is that we are dealing with a conditional with a nec-
essarily false antecedent. I am not sure how to evaluate this conditional. 
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Even if conditionals with necessarily false antecedents can be non-trivially 
true, why think that the answer to i) is "yes" (on the assumption of impec-
cability)? Why not think that God's moral nature is privileged in a robust 
sense, so that God would be unable to stab an innocent child even if, as is 
impossible, God so willed? Needless to say, I have serious doubts that a 
"yes" answer to question i) is correct. But even if it is, it does not establish 
God's omnipotence. For, God's omnipotence is established only if God can 
so will. As has been argued by others16, the inability to will or decide can 
itself detract from one's powers. Maybe it is true that Katie would be a 
very successful mathematician were she to dedicate herself to that avoca-
tion. But, for psychological reasons, she is unable (literally, unable) to so 
ded.icate herself. Some may argue that Katie has the power to be a very 
successful mathematician because of the truth of the above conditional. 
But if the psychological condition is genuine, then it seems obvious to me 
that, sadly, Katie does not have the power to be a very successful math-
ematician. The analogy to God should be obvious. 
I have argued that we should equate power with "can do." Let's consid-
er a different objector, one who agrees with this equation. But this objector 
argues that, contrary to what has been assumed thus far, God can stab the 
innocent child, though, because of impeccability, in no world does God 
stab the innocent. Why does this objector think God can stab the innocent? 
Because in other possible worlds God moves the knife, or a knife-like ob-
ject, in a "stabbing manner" into various objects. Perhaps in some worlds 
God even stabs evil-doers as a legitimate punishment. In virtue of these 
facts about other possible worlds, this objector claims that God can stab 
the innocent child of our actual world. 
Of course God has the power to move the knife in a "stabbing man-
ner," and perhaps God even has the power to stab evil-doers. But can God 
stab the innocent? There are at least two components to this question. Can 
God a) move an object in this manner, b) into someone with certain moral 
properties? The first component picks out a purely physical counterpart 
relation that is satisfied -God can move knives in a "stabbing manner." 
But our question adds a moral component, b), to the counterpart relation. 
And there are no possible worlds in which God moves a knife in a "stab-
bing manner" into a morally innocent person. The counterpart relation 
with both physical and moral components is not satisfied. So, God cannot 
stab an innocent child. 
Premise 3 
We can conceive of various possible beings that differ with respect to their 
powers to bring about states of affairs. There is no contradiction in the 
idea of a being with the power to bring about all the states of affairs that 
God can bring about, but also with the power to bring about immoral 
states of affairs. Such a being would, by definition, fail to be impeccable. 
And it is absurd to think that our ethical concepts rule out the possibility 
of such a (more powerful) being. 
It is not good enough to respond: "True, in light of this possible being 
with the power to bring about immoral states of affairs, God is not omnip-
otent. Still, God is almighty. That is, God has power over all things." It may 
be that God has power over all actual things. But, being almighty in this 
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sense is not good enough for divinity (let alone omnipotency). For, we can 
conceive of worlds in which very limited creatures nevertheless have pow-
er over everything else in the world. As the limiting case of such thought 
experiments, I can imagine a world in which only I exist and am, therefore, 
almighty in this sense. This should show that almightiness should not be 
the standard for divine power, and God must be more than almighty. 
Those in the Anselmian tradition will reject the tenor of the previous two 
paragraphs.17 As a necessary and otherwise perfect existent, they object, God 
exists in all possible worlds and is the most powerful being in each world. 
The claims of this section, they continue, are simply examples in which con-
ceivability does not track possibility. Yes, it is conceivable that there be a 
being with the powers of God plus those powers excluded by impeccability, 
but by metaphysical necessity such "possibilities" are excluded. 
First note, however, that the typical examples of alleged conceivability-
to-possibility failures are different in kind. They involve either a misde-
scription of a genuine possibility (e.g., conceiving of watery-stuff as water 
instead of the distinct chemical kind XYZ) or a sketchy conception due to 
ignorance of scientific or mathematical/logical facts (e.g., conceiving of this 
exact same physical stuff but without consciousness, or conceiving of the 
falsity of Fermat's Last Theorem). My conception of a being with the pow-
ers of God, plus the powers to bring about immoral states of affairs, fits 
neither pattern. It does not involve a misdescription, since I am not assign-
ing any name at all to the being I imagine-I am simply imagining it with 
certain powers. Nor does this conception seem to play on any scientific or 
logical ignorance-How could adding the power to stab the innocent vio-
late a law of nature or logic? Instead, such a "possibility" is supposed to be 
ruled out by some strange, sui generis force of metaphysical necessity. The 
mind boggles when contemplating the nature of this force that forestalls 
the realization of the more-powerful being I imagine. One could always 
claim that conceivability is no guarantee of possibility, but for particular 
cases an explanation of the alleged failure should be at hand. 
But second, note that I am agreeing with the Anselmian that God is the 
perfect being-we are simply disputing what this amounts to. In the next 
section, I argue that power is not intrinsically valuable. If that argument is 
successful, it will certainly undercut some of the concern over allowing for 
possible beings that have powers beyond those of God. But problems still 
appear to arise for my view on the assumption that necessary existence is a 
perfection. For, if God exists in every possible world (or in none), then I am 
committed to a possible world in which God exists along with a being that 
possesses God's powers and then some. The easy way out of this situation 
would be simply to insist (or argue) that necessary existence is not a per-
fection. Then, God can be admitted in some possible worlds, and this other 
powerful, but not impeccable, being in others. I judge this to be at least a 
live option. However, we could even agree with the Anselmian that neces-
sary existence is a perfection. Then, if my conception tracks possibility, in 
some possible world God exists along with this other powerful being. I 
do not see how this possibility threatens God's perfection. Perfection may 
simply require, additionally, that God's will prevails in such a world. 
Though I stand behind this defense of Premise 3, Premise 3 and Prem-
ise 1 (The Maximality of Omnipotence) could be weakened in a way that 
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preserves the conclusion. This modification also offers greater appeal to 
the Traditional Anselmian in virtue of jettisoning the conceivability prem-
if;e which claims the possibility of a being more powerful than God. The 
modification is as follows. ls Let's concede, against our original Premise 3, 
that there is no possible being that possesses all of God's powers and then 
some. Still, there are large classes of actual (and possible) beings that have 
powers that God lacks. I have in mind, in particular, the power to bring 
about various states of affairs forbidden by morality. We could replace 
Premise 1 with the following: 
1'. If there is some class of actual beings BI-Bn, each of whom has pow-
er p, and actual being A lacks p, then A is not omnipotent.19 
This is supposed to be intuitive- "Look, we can all bring about some out-
come that you cannot. You must not be omnipotent then." We then re-
place the conceivability premise, Premise 3, with the following statement 
of fact: 
3'. There is a class of actual beings (e.g., some class of human beings), 
each of whom has the power, say, to cause morally forbidden harms 
to others, and God (assuming God exists) lacks this power. 
The conclusion in 4 still follows. True, the Traditional Anselmian could 
insist that God cannot acquire this p, due to constraints on God's essence. 
(Perhaps we should then conclude that an omnipotent being is not pos-
~ible.) But we could still rely on the intuitive pull of PI' to insist that God 
is not omnipotent. 
Those who distort and weaken the meaning of 'omnipotence' do so, it 
seems, out of a sense of respect for God's omnibenevolence. It is generally 
left unexplained, however, why the converse cannot hold as well-Le., 
distorting and weakening the meaning of 'omnibenevolence' or 'impec-
cability' out of respect for God's omnipotence. That is, the fact that God is 
omnipotent might be taken as more fundamental, and then God's omnibe-
nevolence and impeccability could be understood as being morally good 
to the greatest extent that is compatible with being supremely powerful. 
lf supreme power requires the ability to perform moral wrongs, then, by 
parity of reasoning, we would be entitled to conclude that an omnibenev-
olent (or even impeccable?!) being is one that nevertheless can do moral 
1Nrong (contrary to our premise 2).20 In fact, this conclusion (which I am 
not endorsing) is more palatable than the alleged limitations on omnipo-
fence, since omnipotence is clearly a modal notion and omnibenevolence 
is not clearly a modal notion. That said, I believe that our untutored, and 
un-perverted, understanding of 'potency' and 'benevolence' should stand. 
Omnipotency conflicts with impeccability, and I now turn to reasons for 
privileging moral properties in such situations of conflict. 
A Kantian Inspired Justification 
Kant famously argued that the only unqualified (unconditional and in-
trinsic) good is a good will. 21 While we do not have to accept this claim, it 
IS worth returning to his reasons for denying that other qualities are good 
without qualification. Kant reasoned that not even power and intelligence 
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are good without qualification, as intelligence and power can be used to-
ward evil ends. Presumably, Kant would claim that the power and intel-
ligence of, say, the Devil are not valuable, as they are used to evil ends and 
are not intrinsically valuable. Recall that our first requirement for a perfec-
tion is that it be an intrinsically desirable or valuable property. We said 
that omni-massiveness is not a perfection, because omni-massiveness is 
not an intrinsically desirable or valuable property. I now wish to consider 
whether omnipotence meets this requirement. Many have assumed that 
it is, and have worshipped and praised God in virtue of his metaphysical 
greatness. But, is potency different than massiveness in this regard? 
First, we should ask what is meant by an "intrinsically desirable or 
valuable property." Desirable or valuable to whom? Potency very well 
might be desired or valued by the powerful individual, but it in no way 
follows that the power of that individual is to be desired or valued from 
the third-person perspective. And the latter is the appropriate perspective 
for making evaluations of praise-worthiness and perfection. The Devil, 
let us assume, has great power. Putting aside his moral failings, is the 
Devil an object of (limited) worship, praise, or respect simply in virtue 
of his metaphysical greatness? We might envy or fear the Devil's power, 
but it does not seem like a trait worthy of worship, praise, or respect. As 
with earthly political figures, there may be prudential reasons to worship, 
praise, or respect the powerfulness of supernatural beings. But I fail to see 
the non-prudential reasons for so doing-it is not desirable or valuable 
from the third-person perspective. 
If power were an intrinsic good, then beings with equal amounts of 
power would be equally praiseworthy in that respect. Assume a Super-
Devil, with the perfections of God but for a moral inversion (along with 
any required changes in potency, due to impeccability concerns, that might 
arise from this). If the power of God is intrinsically valuable and praise-
worthy (i.e., absent any consideration of God's other properties), then the 
power of the Super-Devil would similarly be intrinsically valuable and 
praiseworthy. But this seems perverse. The power of the Super-Devil is not 
intrinsically valuable and praiseworthy, and so similarly for that of God. 
Of course we often do say that many traits, even when employed to 
ends we adamantly disagree with (on moral or other grounds), are wor-
thy of respect in a non-prudential sense, though many of these traits are 
not fitting for divinity. A boxer may respect the physical strength of his 
hated foe. A mountain climber may respect the height of an imposing 
mountain. Or a military general may respect the acumen of his counter-
part. Does the respect, and even reverence, many have for these traits, 
despite the (perceived) fact that they are not being employed to some 
morally good end, show that they are intrinsically valuable? And if height 
is intrinsically valuable, as in our case of the mountain, is omni-height 
a perfection we should attribute to God? Of course this is absurd, but 
wherein lies the difference between height and, say, moral properties? 
The difference is that in each of the examples of this paragraph, the prop-
erty in question is not intrinsically valuable, but valuable only relative to 
the kind or task in question. Mountain climbers may respect the height of 
mountains, but dog breeders may respect the diminution of a Toy Poodle. 
Obviously, height is not prized equally for all kinds of beings. Similarly, 
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the physical strength of a boxer and the military acumen of a general are 
valued relative to a sporting or political environment. When we respect 
these traits, even in our sporting and political enemies, we are recogniz-
ing that they possess high values for a trait that is central to performing a 
given task. They are conditional goods, whereas moral goods are categori-
cal. In the cases described above, we respect their level of ability (e.g., rela-
tive to other examples of their kind), not necessarily the ability itself (e.g., 
as compared to other traits one could have). When the boxer respects the 
physical strength of his opponent, he is rating the opponent's physical 
strength favorably as compared to other boxers and/or other possible val-
ues. The boxer needn't make any judgment, however, valuing strength as 
compared to other traits boxers can have (e.g., mental discipline, speed, 
or even friendliness, physical attractiveness, etc.). 
Recall that we are operating on the stipulation that God is the perfect be-
ing. It is certainly not obvious, however, that there is a unique set of charac-
teristics that we should attribute to such a being. Still, there are limitations 
and guiding rules for such attributions. My contention has been that only 
properties that are intrinsically valuable, or needed (as a means) to achieve 
something intrinsically valuable, should be attributed to God. Further, I 
have argued that moral properties, but not potency properties, are intrinsi-
cally valuable. This suggests the following speculative principle: 
Ockham's Razor Thesis of Divine Potency: Since potency is not in-
trinsically valuable (i.e., praiseworthy in a non-prudential sense), we 
should attribute potency to God only to the extent that such attribu-
tions are necessary to achieve what is intrinsically valuable. 
Unlike Kant, I allow for the possibility that non-moral properties might 
be intrinsic goods. Epistemic properties might be such an example, con-
sistent with attributions of omniscience to God. Minimally, a perfect be-
ing would have the knowledge and power to perform all (required, if not 
supererogatory) morally good actions. 
The Earthly Moral 
Philosophy of religion, like the space program, earns its keep not only 
from its own innovations and intrinsic interest, but also from the "spin-
offs" it contributes to other areas. These philosophical spin-offs have in-
cluded contributions to our understanding of modality, free will, personal 
identity, and, as in the present case, our concepts of power and moral-
ity. I wish to conclude by extending the above conclusions to the secu-
lar sphere. (We could reason in the other direction as well. That is, these 
secular claims, if accepted, can be extended to offer more support for our 
conclusion regarding God's limited potency.) 
First, in evaluating our fellow humans and human institutions for their 
praiseworthiness-not in this or that particular regard, but simply as 
agents or people period-we should, and generally do, give their moral 
properties greater weight than their power properties. The athleticism or 
physical strength of another can be impressive or fear-inspiring (when 
directed in a mean-spirited way), but does not seem praiseworthy in our 
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third person, non-prudential sense. Nor is the power of a tyrant worthy 
of sincere praise. 
Second, as with God, our moral properties can weaken our potency and 
limit our options. This observation coheres with ordinary observation and 
talk. A country whose military follows the Geneva Conventions is thereby 
put at a military disadvantage compared to a country that does not. When 
a wartime enemy uses innocent civilians to protect military interests, the 
other side, if bound by morality, has its options (i.e., what it can do) lim-
ited in virtue of this fact. And similar points hold in private affairs. An 
individual who is moral might be incapable of doing certain wrongs or 
failing to do good. Such a person can then be put in situations where this 
virtue is exploited. An unscrupulous father does not attempt to provide 
for his children. The grandparents are appalled. They have the financial 
means to support their grandchildren, but do not want to reinforce the 
irresponsibility of their son. The son is manipulative, and repeatedly asks 
the grandparents for financial support. The grandparents always give in. 
"We couldn't let our grandchild suffer," they explain to their friends when 
the exploitation is pointed out. 
For both humans and divines, it is better to be good than strong. And 
sometimes being good makes you weaker. For these reasons, some can do 
more than God, but none is better.22 
University of Arkansas 
NOTES 
1. I am not necessarily endorsing possible worlds talk as the grounds of 
modal claims, but accepting it at least for heuristic purposes. 
2. This" doctoring" comes in various forms. Some argue that omnipo-
tence should not be understood in terms of the power to bring about states 
of affairs, or that the" ability" to do evil is not a power, but a deficiency or 
liability (Anselm, Aquinas, Gellman, and Mawson), or that omnipotence only 
requires the ability to do what does not conflict with the rest of one's essence 
or with certain contingent features of the world (e.g., Gellman, Wierenga, and 
Flint and Freddoso). Others think that the above example presents a genuine 
conflict, and preserve God's omnipotency by giving up impeccability (Gule-
serian [1983]). I follow Morriston (20Gl) in holding that there is a genuine 
conflict between omnipotency and impeccability, and opting for denying God 
the former. 
3. For the rest of this paper I will assume that God does exist, and omit 
this qualification. The inquiry will then be into God's nature. 
4. I am aware that some will deny that the perfect being is the being most 
worthy of worship and praise. This equivalence should then be treated as an 
assumption. It certainly seems to me that, if there is a perfect being, it is the 
being most worthy of praise (because it is perfect). And, conversely, a being is 
perfect because it has those traits that are praiseworthy. 
5. So, this is a work in the tradition of perfect being theology-compare 
with Morris (1987) and Gellman (1977), p. 31. No attempt will be made to 
reconcile this account of God with that offered by any of the world's major 
religions. I am not approaching this as someone with pre-set theological 
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views-e.g., assuming that God must have such-and-such properties. Rather, 
1 am assuming that God is perfect, and then figuring out what properties God 
must have. 
6. Essential omnibenevolence is equivalent to, or a species of, impeccabil-
ity as defined above. 
'7. Geach (1973) and LaCroix (1977). 
8. Guleserian (1985). 
9. Compare this with Wierenga (1989), p. 14. 
LO. Aquinas, Pt. 1, Reply to Objection 2, Article 3, Question 25. 
L1. Wielenberg (2000), p. 37 (italics in original). 
12. Wielenberg (2000), p. 38. 
13. This suggests other limitations on God's power-e.g., God lacks the 
power to be a physical cause. 
14. Significantly, this is why the Pike (1969) proposal to the omnipotence-
impeccability conflict fails. Pike proposed that God had the ability to sin, but 
was strongly disposed never to exercise this ability. But I have argued that if 
God would never so will (i.e., exercise the ability), then God lacks this power/ 
ability. God does not have anything like physical strength to fall back on to 
justify attributing the power/ability to sin. 
So, on the present view, God's will is God's power. This means that limits 
on God's will are limits on God's power. If God's moral nature limits what he 
can will, then it also limits his power. 
The present view agrees with Geach (1973) in the following regard: " ... 
but what God cannot be said to be able to do he likewise cannot will to do; we 
cannot drive a logical wedge between his power and his will, which are, as 
the Scholastics said, really identical, and there is no application to God of the 
concept of trying but failing." (p. 8) And even more pertinent is the following: 
"Well, as regards a man it makes good sense to say: 'He has the bodily and 
mental power to do so-and-so, but he certainly will not, it would be point-
le~sly silly and wicked.' But does anything remotely like this make sense to 
say about Almighty God?" (p. 16) (Also compare with Gellman (1977), p. 34.) 
15. Compare with Aquinas: "Now it is true that the philosopher says that 
God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on condi-
tion, the antecedent of which is impossible-as, for instance, if we were to say 
that God can do evil things if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional 
proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent 
are impossible; as if one were to say: If a man is an ass, he has four feet." (Pt. 1, 
Reply to Objection 2, Article 3, Question 25.) 
16. E.g., Morriston (2001), pp. 155-56. 
17. Thanks to Tom Senor for drawing my attention to the problem raised 
in this paragraph. 
18. This modification was also suggested by Tom Senor. 
19. This formulation might need some qualification. For example, de se 
powers (e.g., powers of the form "the power to make it the case that I ... ") 
present a complication. There are innumerable de se powers that we possess, 
but God lacks. I have the power to make it the case that 1 am riding a bicycle. 
But God lacks this de se power due to God's non-physical nature, let us sup-
pose. It does not seem that this should count against God's omnipotence. It 
has already been acknowledged that lacking certain "powers" -e.g., to cause 
someone else's free action-does not count against omnipotence. De se powers 
seem to be of a similar kind. (I have the power to freely move my arm, God can-
not make my arm move freely, but this does not threaten God's omnipotence.) 
Again, I prefer to think of powers as the ability to bring about certain states 
of affairs (outcomes). Lots of us can bring about a state of affairs in which an 
innocent person is wrongfully harmed (outcome). We are assuming that God 
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cannot do this. None of us can bring it about that God is riding a bicycle, so 
it should not count against God's omnipotence, as far as l' is concerned, that 
God cannot bring it about that God is riding a bicycle either. 
20. Of course, I think it would be flat-out contradictory to say that such a 
being is impeccable. But my point is that it is also flat-out contradictory to say 
that a being that cannot do evil is omnipotent. 
21. Kant (1990), First Section. 
22. Thanks to Tom Senor for many extremely helpful discussions and com-
ments on this paper. 
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